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Executive Summary
The 2015 Paris Agreement elevates the goal of
climate adaptation to the same level of importance
as the goal of climate mitigation, and emphasizes
the need to mobilize finance for climate adaptation
in developing countries. As of February 2017,
however, the financial gap for climate adaptation
remained monumental. With the administration
of US President Donald Trump threatening to
interrupt American financial flows to the climate
regime, developing countries are expressing
growing concern about the ability of developed
country parties to mobilize enough finance to meet
the sizeable costs of their climate adaptation needs.
In this context, the question of how to equitably
allocate scarce adaptation finance among
competing developing countries has gained
renewed relevance. The operating entities serving
the financial mechanism of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), such as the Global Environment
Facility (GEF), the Adaptation Fund (AF) and
the Green Climate Fund (GCF), have granted
two groups of countries — the small island
developing states (SIDS) and the least developed
countries (LDCs) — priority access to adaptation
resources. Adaptation funds do not clearly
differentiate among developing countries
beyond these two priority group categories.
The primary criterion for allocation of adaptation
finance among developing countries outside
the LDCs or SIDS groups has been “vulnerability
to the adverse effects of climate change.”
However, political agreement on the concept of
climate vulnerability has proven elusive, and
therefore operating entities have considerable
discretion in deciding which countries are
considered particularly vulnerable. In practice,
high-income developing countries such as
Chile, with higher capacity to mobilize private
finance and domestic public finance for climate
adaptation than lower-middle-income countries
such as Guatemala, have been able to access a
sizeable share of scarce adaptation finance.
The current formula has proven insufficient to
address important equity concerns in the allocation
of adaptation finance among developing countries.
This paper argues that the operating entities of the
financial mechanism serving the Paris Agreement,

especially the GCF, should incorporate an objective,
income-based criterion based on gross national
income (GNI) per capita to complement the
subjective criterion of vulnerability as primary
guidance, ensuring a more equitable allocation
of scarce climate adaptation finance to those
countries with lower financial capabilities.

Introduction
The twenty-second session of the Conference
of the Parties (COP 22) to the UNFCCC, held in
Marrakesh in November 2016, placed into evidence
both the magnitude of projected costs to cover
adaptation needs in developing countries, and
the sizeable gap in financial resources needed to
cover these costs. The matter of how to equitably
allocate adaptation finance among developing
countries was not resolved during COP 21,
which produced the 2015 Paris Agreement, and
it remained unresolved after Marrakesh.
SIDS and LDCs have been the only two groups
of countries given priority access to adaptation
finance. Which criteria should the financial
mechanisms serving the Paris Agreement use for
prioritizing the allocation of adaptation funds
among other potentially competing developing
countries? So far, the primary criterion has been the
level of vulnerability to climate change impacts.
Parties have not agreed on a definition for the
concept of vulnerability. In practice, all indications
point to significant global adaptation funds being
invested in developing countries with higher
income levels, which often have comparatively
lower levels of geographical vulnerability, lower
levels of socio-economic vulnerability, and greater
capacity to mobilize domestic financial resources
and private finance for climate adaptation.
This paper argues that the operating entities
of the financial mechanism serving the Paris
Agreement should adopt an objective criterion
linked to income levels to complement the
broad criterion of vulnerability, thus ensuring a
more equitable allocation of scarce adaptation
resources among developing countries. This
is especially the case for the GCF, which is
expected to become the most important source
of international public finance for adaptation.
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This paper is divided as follows: first, it
contextualizes the growing political and
normative importance given to adaptation in the
climate regime, which stands in contrast to the
unresolved challenge of reducing the sizeable
deficit in adaptation finance available to developing
countries. Second, it reviews the state of the current
legal and policy framework for allocating scarce
adaptation finance in the climate regime. Third, the
paper discusses the limitations of “vulnerability”
as the primary criterion for allocation of scarce
adaptation finance among competing developing
countries. Fourth, it considers the experience of
international development financial institutions
such as the World Bank and the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global
Fund) in adopting equity criteria to guide
funding allocation. The paper closes with an
argument for the incorporation of an incomebased criterion to complement the criterion of
vulnerability in the GCF and other operating
entities of the UNFCCC financial mechanism.

Climate Adaptation and
Adaptation Finance: From
Periphery to Centre Stage
The Paris Agreement, adopted at COP 21 to the
UNFCCC in December 2015, elevated climate
adaptation to the legal core of the climate
regime, alongside climate mitigation. According
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), climate mitigation is “a human
intervention to reduce the sources or enhance
the sinks of greenhouse gases,”1 while climate
adaptation is “the process of adjustment to
actual or expected climate and its effects.”2

1

2

2

IPCC, 2014: “Summary for Policymakers” in O Edenhofer et
al, eds, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 4.
IPCC, 2014 “Summary for Policymakers” in CB Field et al, eds, Climate
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Part A: Global
and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 5.
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Unlike the 1997 Kyoto Protocol3 and the 1992
UNFCCC,4 which established only mitigation as
a core legal goal, article 2 of the Paris Agreement
included a global goal to increase “the ability to
adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change
and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse
gas emissions development, in a manner
that does not threaten food production.”5 The
adaptation goal has been given the same legal
priority as the long-term mitigation goal to hold
“the increase in the global average temperature
to well below 2oC above pre-industrial levels
and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5oC above pre-industrial levels.”6
Other elements of the Paris Outcome, formed by the
Paris Agreement and the decision which has legally
adopted it, reinforce the important position now
given to adaptation in the climate regime. Article
7 of the Paris Agreement is entirely dedicated to
climate adaptation, departing from the approach in
the texts of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, where
adaptation was at best a secondary objective.
Article 7 of the Paris Agreement unequivocally
establishes that adaptation “is a key component of
and contributes to the long-term global response to
climate change.”7 Article 2 of the Paris Agreement
also introduces a third goal to make “finance flows
consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse
gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”8
The language of the financial goal emphasizes that
support to adaptation action is key to promote a
climate-resilient development pathway. Article
9 of the Paris Agreement, on climate finance,
reiterates that “Parties shall provide financial
resources to assist developing country Parties
with respect to both mitigation and adaptation.”9

3

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148, Annex B (entered into
force 21 May 1994) [Kyoto Protocol].

4

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992,
1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [UNFCCC], online:
<unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>.

5

UNFCCC, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, UN
Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Dec 1/CP.21 (entered into force 4
November 2016) [Paris Agreement]. The agreement will (in time) become
a separate, binding instrument; see article 2(b) of the Paris Agreement.

6

Ibid, supra note 5, art 2(a).

7

Ibid, art 7(2).

8

Ibid, art 2(c).

9

Ibid, art 9(1). See also article 9(4), which reiterates: “The provision of
scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between
adaptation and mitigation.”

The Paris Agreement represents a decisive step
in what has proved a long process to change the
legal and political landscape for climate adaptation
and for adaptation finance in the climate regime.
Adaptation took the back seat in the climate
regime for almost a decade, as many considered
it a distraction from the crucial goal of climate
mitigation.10 In the aftermath of the adoption of the
UNFCCC, a significant number of parties agreed
to the urgency of promoting the convention’s core
goal of climate mitigation, and worked toward
the establishment of a dedicated legal instrument
to promote emissions reductions by developed
countries, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Parties to the
UNFCCC did not sustain the same level of efforts
to establish an equivalent dedicated protocol to
promote climate adaptation at the time. Climate
adaptation would progressively gain more space
in the global efforts to address climate change, as
new scientific studies demonstrated the magnitude
of the impacts and risks of climate change, and
as the Kyoto Protocol proved unable to promote
significant global emissions reductions.11
The gradual progression of both adaptation action
and adaptation finance from peripheral objectives
to central goals of the global climate regime has
happened in tandem. This parallel development
stems from two inverse relationships. First, the
inverse relationship between contributions to
the causes of climate change and vulnerabilities
to the impacts and risks of climate change.
Often, the countries that contribute with larger
shares of absolute or per capita greenhouse
gas emissions, such as the United States and
countries in the European Union, are among the
least vulnerable to the impacts or risks of climate
change.12 The second inverse relationship is the
one between the contribution to the causes of
climate change and the capability to adapt to its
impacts and risks. The countries that have least
contributed to climate change, such as Bangladesh
or Guatemala, tend to be the countries least
capable (financially and technologically) to adapt.
As the evidence of the rising need for climate

10 MR Khan & JT Roberts, “Adaptation and international climate policy,”
(2013) 4:3 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 171 at 171
[Khan & Roberts]; A Aersson & N Hall, “Global climate adaptation
governance: Why is it not legally binding?” (2017) Eur J Intl Relations 1.
11 Khan & Roberts, supra note 10 at 15.
12 Glenn Althor, James EM Watson & Richard A Fuller, “Global mismatch
between greenhouse gas emissions and the burden of climate change”
(2016) Scientific Reports 6.

adaptation has mounted, in the wake of the failure
of large emitters (developed countries, as well as
emerging economies with growing emissions)
to sufficiently mitigate, so have the indications
that those countries with lower contributions to
climate change would need international financial
support to address climate impacts and risks.
The first important milestone for climate adaptation
and adaptation finance in the global regime would
happen at COP 7, in 2001 in Marrakesh, almost
a decade after the creation of the framework
convention.13 COP 7 dedicated special attention to
the “specific needs and special circumstances of
developing country Parties, especially those that
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects
of climate change, and of those Parties, especially
developing country Parties, which would have
to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden
under the Convention.”14 The 2001 Marrakesh
Accords established guidelines for developing
countries to prepare National Adaptation
Programs of Action (NAPAs) that would help
identify national and global adaptation needs.15
To address the special adaptation needs of
the LDCs, COP 7 established an LDC group of
experts to propose future measures to support
this specific set of developing countries. During
COP 7, three funds were created to support
climate action in developing countries, with all
three funds expressing the intention to devote
special attention to climate adaptation: the
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF); the
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF); and the
AF. COP 13, in 2007, adopted the Bali Action
Plan, which included adaptation as one of the
four key pillars of climate action, alongside
mitigation, technology transfer and finance.16
The controversial COP 15, in Copenhagen in
2009, has often been considered an example of
diplomatic malfunction, since it failed to generate
the expected, new, legally binding multilateral

13 For an account of the history of international climate finance, see
Alexander Zahar, Climate Change Finance and International Law
(London, UK: Routledge, 2016).
14 UNFCCC, Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the
Convention (decision 3/CP.3 and Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 3,
paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol), (2001) Dec 5/CP.7 at 32, online:
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf#page=32>.
15 UNFCCC, Bali Action Plan, (2007) Decision 1/CP.13 at 3, online:
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf>.
16 Khan & Roberts, supra note 10.
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climate agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol
post-2020.17 Recent opinion makes the compelling
argument that the Copenhagen Accord resulting
from COP 15 in fact contained all the central
elements that would lead parties to the UNFCCC
to successfully adopt the Paris Agreement six years
later, in December 2015.18 The late compromise
between the United States and emerging economies
that opened the way for the Copenhagen Accord
planted the seeds of the important paradigm shift
that is reflected in the Paris Agreement, which
established a non-legally binding, universally
applied system of self-defined commitments for
developed countries and developing countries alike
(replacing the Kyoto Protocol system of exclusive
mitigation obligations for developed countries).19
Although most parties to the UNFCCC only
“took notice” of the Copenhagen Accord in 2009,
refusing to endorse it as a legal document at
the time due to strong disagreement with what
was considered a non-inclusive process, they
would officially embrace the main elements
of the Copenhagen Accord in future COPs. In
Copenhagen, emerging economies and other
developing countries agreed to participate more
significantly in the global mitigation efforts,
albeit with voluntary pledges, in exchange for
commitments by developed countries to continue
taking the lead in climate action, commensurate
with their responsibilities for climate change and
their capabilities. Developed countries agreed to
adopt economy-wide emissions reductions in their
voluntary and self-defined mitigation pledges,20
while providing finance for climate mitigation
and adaptation,21 as well as technology transfer
and capacity building to developing countries.
As part of the compromise, developed countries
agreed to bring adaptation to the core of the

climate regime. The Copenhagen Accord had just
one paragraph entirely dedicated to adaptation.22
Another crucial element of the 2009 Copenhagen
compromise was the pledge by developed countries
to mobilize US$100 billion per year in climate
finance for developing countries by 2020, and
to balance the allocation of this climate finance
between adaptation and mitigation.23 Following
Copenhagen, COP 16 in 2010 approved the Cancun
Agreements, which included the creation of an
Adaptation Framework, albeit as a mechanism
of the UNFCCC, not a stand-alone protocol such
as Kyoto.24 The 2009 Copenhagen Accord and
subsequent COP decisions have influenced the
design of the 2015 Paris Agreement’s provisions on
adaptation and adaptation finance. Article 7 of the
Paris Agreement, entirely dedicated to adaptation,
recognizes that the current needs for adaptation
are significant, and stresses the “importance of
support for and international cooperation on
adaptation efforts.”25 Paragraph 52 of the Adoption
of the Paris Agreement expressly states that
“financial resources provided to developing country
Parties should enhance the implementation of
their policies, strategies, regulations and action
plans and their climate change actions with
respect to both mitigation and adaptation.”26
Despite the high political and legal profile parties
have given to climate adaptation and adaptation
finance in the current climate regime, there is
presently a significant adaptation finance gap
that greatly constrains the capacity of many
developing countries to adequately address
their adaptation needs. This is the case not
only for LDCs and SIDS, but also for many
other lower-income and lower-middle-income
developing countries, which do not have adequate
domestic financial and technological capacity
to embark on the needed adaptation action.

17 Robert Falkner, Hannes Stephan & John Vogler, “International Climate
Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a ‘Building Blocks’ Approach” (2010)
1:3 Global Policy 252.
18 Daniel Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?”
(2016) 110:2 Am J Intl L 288; Robert Falkner, “The Paris Agreement and
the new logic of international climate politics” (2016) 92:5 Intl Affairs
1107.
19 Bodansky, supra note 18.
20 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord, 18 December 2009, FCCC/
CP/2009/11/Add.1, Dec 2/CP.15, art 4 (entered into force 30 March
2010) [Copenhagen Accord].
21 Ibid, arts 3, 8.

4
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22 Ibid, art 3.
23 Ibid, art 8.
24 Cancun Agreements, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 at para 102 [Cancun
Agreements].
25 Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art 7.
26 Ibid at para 52.

The Adaptation Finance
Gap
The Paris outcome formalized developed countries’
pledge to mobilize US$100 billion per year in
climate finance to developing countries by 2020,
and added the commitment to discuss a more
ambitious quantified annual financial goal to
start in 2025.27 This financial commitment is
intended to support both climate mitigation
and climate adaptation in a balanced manner.28
Financial flows for climate action have been
steadily increasing in recent years.29
At first sight, this rise could be an indication that
it would be possible to eventually raise sufficient
funds to cover the total adaptation needs of
interested developing countries. When existing and
projected financial flows are broken down by source
(private and public) and objective (mitigation
and adaptation), however, the magnitude of the
challenge to raise sufficient finance to cover even
the most conservative projected adaptation costs
in developing countries becomes evident.30
The challenge was recently illustrated by a 2015
report prepared by the Climate Policy Institute
to track climate finance flows and to evaluate
progress toward the US$100-billion commitment.31
The study found a significant increase in climate
finance in 2014, with global financial flows reaching
US$391 billion due to record private investments
in renewable energy projects.32 Yet, private
investments account for the bulk of climate finance,
reaching US$241 billion in 2014. And private finance
flows are primarily invested in mitigation projects
in upper middle- or high-income countries.33 In
fact, 92 percent of private climate finance has

27 Ibid at para 53.
28 Ibid at para 52.
29 Barbara Buchner et al, Global Landscape of Climate Finance
2015, Climate Policy Initiative (November 2015), online: <http://
climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climatefinance-2015/>.
30 Martin Stadelmann, Axel Michaelowa & J Timmons Roberts, “Difficulties
in accounting for private finance in international climate policy” (2013)
13:6 Climate Policy 718.

remained in the country of origin.34 In other words,
countries that have financial capabilities are
investing heavily in domestic climate mitigation.
Public global financial flows were also on the
rise, although less substantially than private
funds, reaching more than US$148 billion in 2014.
Yet, most of the public financial flows were still
dedicated to climate mitigation. Ninety-three
percent of total climate financial flows — public
and private — in 2014 went to mitigation projects.35
Developed countries’ mobilization of adaptation
funds to developing countries remains markedly
insufficient to cover the estimated costs. A
2016 United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) report entitled The Adaptation Finance
Gap Report assessed the difference between the
projected costs of adaptation measures to meet
the collective adaptation needs in developing
countries, and projected international financial
flows to cover these costs.36 First, the UNEP
report reassesses projected adaptation costs,
concluding that they are likely to be two to three
times higher for the period 2010–2030, and four to
five times higher for the period 2010–2050, when
compared to earlier estimates presented in the
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 2014.37
The AR5 estimated that costs for adaptation in
developing countries would amount to US$70
billion to US$100 billion a year by 2050, albeit
recognizing that these estimates should be treated
with low confidence due to data shortcomings
and methodological challenges.38 UNEP’s revised
estimates indicate that adaptation costs could reach
US$280 billion to US$500 billion a year by 2050.
Even if parties to the UNFCCC were to fulfill their
pledges to mobilize the US$100 billion per year to
climate finance by 2020, and to dedicate a balanced
share of this amount to adaptation finance, it
would likely not cover the IPCC’s 2014 estimates,
let alone UNEP’s new projected estimates. The
UNEP report admittedly presents only an indicative
range of costs, based on an assessment of relevant
literature, as there is no central system to estimate

34 Ibid at 10.
35 Ibid at 9.

31 Buchner et al, supra note 29.

36 United Nations Environment Programme, The Adaptation Finance Gap
Report 2016 (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 2016) [Adaptation Finance Gap],
online: <www.unep.org/adaptationgapreport/2016>.

32 Ibid at 1.

37 IPCC, 2014, supra note 2.

33 Ibid at 4, 8.

38 Ibid.
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global costs of adaptation.39 Despite this caveat, it
is possible to conclude that existing and projected
adaptation financial flows pale in comparison to the
magnitude of the projected costs. According to the
UNEP report, adaptation finance reached 17 percent
of public climate finance in 2014, or US$25 billion.40
The UNEP report recognizes that there are not,
as yet, quantitative estimates of private finance
for climate adaptation, due to methodological
challenges of tracking private adaptation finance.
There is, however, evidence that, thus far, most
available funds for adaptation are public, as private
finance tends to flow predominantly to climate
mitigation.41 The 2016 UNEP report concludes that
to meet the estimated costs of adaptation, financial
flows would need to be six to 13 times higher than
existing levels in the period from 2030 to 2050.42
The Adaptation Finance Gap Report leads to the
inevitable conclusion that even if the total target
of the financial pledge is achieved, and adaptation
finance reaches US$50 billion per year by 2020,
it would not be enough to cover the projections
of adaptation costs in developing countries. And
this is not including the possibility that some
developed countries may change course on
their pledges and decide not to provide finance
to climate action in developing countries. This
possibility has unfortunately become very real
with the 2016 election of Donald Trump as the
forty-fifth president of the United States, who
has declared his intention to significantly reduce
American support for international climate finance.
In this context, understanding existing and
potential new criteria to guide the allocation
of limited adaptation financial resources
among competing developing countries is an
important item in current climate discussions,
and it will remain so in the near future.
This paper will concentrate on the allocation
of adaptation finance to developing countries
through the various operating entities of the
financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. To be clear,
developed country parties can channel climate
finance to developing countries, including for
adaptation projects, bilaterally (through existing

development agencies) or via international financial
institutions such as the World Bank or regional
development banks.43 In fact, currently most
adaptation finance is still flowing via bilateral
and multilateral channels outside the UNFCCC
financial mechanism. The specific challenges and
possibilities for creating harmonized allocation
criteria for adaptation finance through bilateral
and multilateral financial channels outside
the UNFCCC financial mechanisms deserve
dedicated examinations, which are outside
the scope of this paper. Ensuring that those
developing countries that need adaptation
finance the most will have priority access to
public financial resources available through
UNFCCC funds should be seen as a first step.
The next section discusses the legal framework
to allocate adaptation finance under the
United Nations climate financial regime.

The UNFCCC Legal
Framework to Allocate
Adaptation Finance
Article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes that
“continuous and enhanced international support
shall be provided to developing country Parties
for the implementation” of adaptation actions.
The language indicates that in legal terms, all
developing countries are equally entitled to
request this support, except that parties will take
into account the special needs of developing
country parties “that are particularly vulnerable
to the adverse effects of climate change.” The COP
21 Paris outcome includes an express provision
establishing that all existing climate funds under

39 Adaptation Finance Gap, supra note 36.
40 Global Landscape, supra note 29 at 9.
41 Ibid.
42 Adaptation Finance Gap, supra note 36 at XIV.
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43 Smita Nakhooda, Charlene Watson & Liane Schalatek, “Global climate
finance architecture”, Climate Funds Update (2016), online: <www.
climatefundsupdate.org/about-climate-fund/global-finance-architecture>.

the UNFCCC will serve the 2015 Paris Agreement.44
Currently, there are four co-existing UNFCCC
funds relevant for adaptation finance:45
→→ the LDCF, under the UNFCCC,
managed by the GEF;
→→ the SCCF, under the UNFCCC,
managed by the GEF;
→→ the AF, under the Kyoto Protocol, managed by
the AF board and hosted by the GEF; and
→→ the GCF, under the UNFCCC, managed
by an independent board.
It is still unclear how these funds will be
shaped in order to avoid duplication and ensure
complementarities when it comes to adaptation
finance. Currently, each of these funds has its
own criteria for eligibility and allocation of
climate finance. Except for the LDCF, which
caters exclusively to a predefined, specific group
of low-income countries, climate funds have
faced obstacles to identify accepted criteria to
effectively guide equitable access to limited
financial resources. What follows is an overview
of the climate funds relevant to adaptation finance
under the UNFCCC and their allocation criteria.
Until 2010, the GEF was the central player in
adaptation finance.46 The GEF was created in 1991
to serve as a financial mechanism to support
the implementation of several multilateral
environmental agreements. The GEF serves as
a financial mechanism to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, the United Nations

44 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first
session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, FCCC/
CP/2015/10/Add.1 at para 58. Paragraph 59 establishes that the
AF, operating under the Kyoto Protocol, might also serve the Paris
Agreement, conditional to a decision by the meeting of the parties to the
Kyoto Protocol. During COP 22 in Marrakesh in 2016, the Conference of
the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
decided that the AF should serve the Paris Agreement, pending decisions
on governance and other issues. See Benito Müller, “Time to Decide!
The Adaptation Fund after Marrakesh”, Oxford Climate Policy (January
2017), online: <www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/
Time_to_Decide_Discussion_Note.pdf>.

Convention to Combat Desertification and the
Minamata Convention on Mercury, besides the
UNFCCC.47 In the UNFCCC climate regime, the GEF
serves as either the administrator or as host to the
three climate funds established by the Marrakesh
Accords in 2001: the LDCF, the SCCF and the AF.48
The LDCF was established in 2001 specifically to
address the urgent and immediate adaptation
needs of the world’s 49 LDCs.49 The LDCF
fulfills its mandate mainly by supporting the
preparation and implementation of LDCs’
NAPAs.50 The LDCF’s capitalization depends on
voluntary contributions. The LDCF is governed
by the LDCF/SCCF Council, which decides
its strategic priorities under guidance from
the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties.51
Only the world’s 49 LDCs are eligible for funding.
The LDCF has established a balanced access
approach, which aims to ensure that all requesting
LDCs will have access to funds for their NAPAs,
rather than providing funds on a first-come,
first-serve basis. Fifteen years after the LDCF’s
establishment, and despite recent growth, the
LDCF has continuously lacked sufficient financial
resources to cover the costs of the LDCs’ requests
for funds. The progress report of the LDCF/SCCF
Council from October 2016 states that the LDCF
funds available for new funding decisions by the
council as of September 2016 amounted to only
$7.43 million, “whereas resources amounting
to $221.44 million were sought for 32 full-sized
projects (FSP) and one medium-sized project
(MSP) that had been technically cleared by
the Secretariat.”52 Another 11 project proposals
amounting to US$77.66 million had been
formally submitted for review by the
Secretariat. The full costs of addressing the

47 International Institute for Sustainable Development, A Summary Report
of the 50th meeting of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council
(Winnipeg, MB: IISD, 2016) at 2, online: <www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/
sd/enbplus192num15e.pdf>.
48 O’Sullivan et al, supra note 45 at 6, 49.
49 UNFCCC, The Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, FCCC/CP/2001/13/
Add.1, Dec 7/CP.7 [Marrakesh Accords].
50 O’Sullivan, supra note 45 at 38.

45 Robert O’Sullivan et al, Creation and Evolution of Adaptation Funds
(Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund, 2011) at 6 [O’Sullivan et al],
online: <www.worldwildlife.org/publications/creation-and-evolution-ofadaptation-funds>.

51 GEF, Evaluation of the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
(Washington, DC: Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office, 2011)
at 3, online: <www.gefieo.org/sites/default/files/ieo/ieo-documents/sccfapproach-paper.pdf>.

46 Bonizella Biagini et al, “A typology of adaptation actions: A global look
at climate adaptation actions financed through the Global Environment
Facility” (2014) 25 Global Environmental Change 97 [Biagini et al].

52 GEF, Progress Report on the Least Developed Countries Fund and the
Special Climate Change Fund, GEF/LDCF.SCCF.21/03, (2016) at 2, para
3.
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urgent and immediate adaptation needs of
LDCs, according to estimates included in their
NAPAs, total $2 billion.53 Even taking into
account that some of the requested assistance
may be considered ineligible or unessential
in the assessment process, the gap is clear.
The LDCs that have been unable to access finance
from the LDCF may, however, access other sources
of adaptation finance, such as the SCCF. The SCCF
was also established in 2001 by the Marrakesh
Accords, and is also governed by the LDCF/SCCF
Council. The council decides the fund’s strategic
priorities, under guidance from the UNFCCC
COP.54 Financed by voluntary contributions from
developed countries listed in annex I of the
UNFCCC, with no periodic replenishing schedule,
the SCCF has been undercapitalized since its
inception and unable to fulfill its mandate.55
Eligibility for the SCCF is open to all developing
countries that are parties to the UNFCCC. The
initial SCCF mandate was broad, encompassing
financial support to a wide range of thematic
windows: adaptation, technology transfer, energy,
transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, waste
management and economic diversification in
oil-exporting developing countries. There were
no initial criteria to prioritize funding to specific
categories of countries or subthemes.56
The SCCF’s low capitalization led to the gradual
creation of priority criteria to allocate funds.
In 2003, COP 9 requested the fund to give top
priority to adaptation activities, while also funding
essential technology transfer projects.57 COP 9
also guided the SCCF to concentrate adaptation
funding in seven predefined areas (water
management, land management, agriculture,
health, infrastructure development, fragile
ecosystems and integrated coastal management).
The SCCF has also combined geographical and
vulnerability criteria to prioritize allocation,
giving preferential access to the most vulnerable
countries in Africa and Asia, as well as the SIDS.58

53 GEF, LDCF/SCCF Council Meetings 20, GEF/LDCF.SCCF.20.
54 GEF, supra note 51 at 3.
55 Ibid at 6. See O’Sullivan et al, supra note 45 at 50.
56 O’Sullivan et al, supra note 45 at 52.
57 Climate Funds Update, “Special Climate Change Fund”, Heinrich
Böll Stiftung: The Green Political Foundation, online: <www.
climatefundsupdate.org/listing/special-climate-change-fund>.
58 O’Sullivan et al, supra note 45 at 52.
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As demand for SCCF finance continued to exceed
capitalization, a series of preselection criteria were
established in 2012, including: project quality;
balanced distribution of funds in the eligible
countries, with an emphasis on vulnerable nonAnnex I countries that have not previously had
access; equitable regional distribution; balanced
support for all priority sectors; and balanced
distribution among GEF agencies based on
comparative advantage.59 The SCCF’s cumulative
financial contribution to adaptation projects
has been limited. From 2006 to 2015, the SCCF
provided a total of only US$286.82 million for
adaptation activities.60 As of October 2016, the
SCCF remained severely underfunded.61 No
new adaptation projects had been approved
in the LDCF/SCCF Council meeting in October
2016 due to insufficient funds available.62
The AF, the third climate fund established by
the 2001 Marrakesh Accords, faces similar
undercapitalization challenges.63 Unlike the LDCF
and the SCCF, the AF was created under the
Kyoto Protocol, not under the UNFCCC.64 The AF
is funded through a share of the proceeds from
transactions of the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), receiving two percent of the market value
of Certified Emission Reductions, complemented
by voluntary contributions.65 AF funds are to be
invested exclusively in adaptation projects in
developing countries that are parties to the Kyoto
Protocol. The AF has its own governance board,
which is completely independent from the GEF. The
AF board decides on allocation criteria, guided by
the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol.66
59 GEF, Pre-selection Criteria for Projects and Programs Submitted under
the Special Climate Change Fund, GEF/LDCF.SCCF.12/Inf.05 (2012).
60 GEF, Progress Report on the Least Developed Countries Fund and the
Special Climate Change Fund, GEF/LDCF.SCCF.21/03 (2016) at 15, para
23.
61 Ibid at 14, para 21.
62 Ibid at para 22.
63 Marrakesh Accords, supra note 49; Britta Horstmann & Achala Chandani
Abeysinghe, “The Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol: A model for
financing adaptation to climate change?” (2011) 2:3 Climate Law 415.
64 AF, “About the Adaptation Fund”, online: <www.adaptation-fund.org/
about/>.
65 Asa Persson & Elise Remling, “Equity and efficiency in adaptation finance:
initial experiences of the Adaptation Fund” (2014) 14:4 Climate Policy
488.
66 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its third session, held in Bali from
3 to 15 December 2007, FCCC/CP/2007/6, Dec 1/CMP.3 at para 5(b);
Dec 5/CMP.2.

All developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol
that are considered “particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change” are eligible to
apply for AF resources to meet their adaptation
costs.67 There was no agreed decision on the concept
of vulnerability, except for the earlier specification
that vulnerable countries should include: “lowlying and other small island countries, countries
with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or
areas liable to floods, drought and desertification,
and developing countries with fragile mountainous
ecosystems.”68 The assumption was that the
proceeds from the CDM would guarantee a steady
and substantial flow of funds for adaptation
activities under the AF, which proved untrue.69
Over time, the scarcity of resources led the AF board
to establish new strategic priorities for funding
allocation among eligible developing countries.70
At the fourth meeting of the parties to the Kyoto
Protocol in 2008, which took place in Poznan,
Poland, the parties endorsed the AF board’s Strategic
Priorities, Policies and Guidelines of the Adaptation
Fund.71 According to the 2008 strategy, decisions
on the allocation of resources will consider:
“(a) Level of vulnerability;
(b) Level of urgency and
risks arising from delay;
(c) Ensuring access to the fund in a
balanced and equitable manner;
(d) Lessons learned in project and programme
design and implementation to be captured;
(e) Securing regional co-benefits to
the extent possible, where applicable;

67 UNFCCC, Dec 1/CMP.3, supra note 66 at 3, paras 1–2.
68 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, held at Montreal
from 28 November to 10 December 2005, Dec 28/CMP.1. See also
UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its fourth session, held in Poznan
from 1 to 12 December 2008, FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2, Dec 1/
CMP.4.

(f) Maximizing multi-sectoral
or cross-sectoral benefits;
(g) Adaptive capacity to the adverse
effects of climate change.”72
All of these criteria remain remarkably broad,
leaving significant room for subjective assessments
made by the board. The board’s subjective
assessment may be based on a combination of
factors, including objective factors. For example,
assessment of the first and last items in the above
list may include objective factors such as GDP/
GNI per capita. Yet the board’s consideration of
objective factors while assessing the criteria is
neither explicit nor mandatory. In other words,
the board members may decide whether or not to
use objective factors in what is primarily a caseby-case analysis using broadly defined criteria.
The continuing shortage of funds has led the AF
to consider three objective criteria to allocate
finance: a uniform cap per country; variable caps
considering the specific circumstances of certain
groups of countries; and variable caps considering
the specific circumstances of each individual
country.73 The board has so far been vague about
what it means by specific circumstances. This set
of criteria helps to ensure that a single developing
country or a small group of developing countries
will not receive a disproportionate share of funds.
However, it does not address the question of equity
related to whether those developing countries
that have comparatively less capacity to mobilize
national and private funds for climate adaptation
are the ones accessing the resources. This goal was
still left under the guidance of the subjective criteria
of “level of vulnerability” and “adaptive capacity.”
The AF mobilized more than US$500 million since
its inception until June 2016. It had allocated
US$338.5 million for adaptation projects.74 A
significant number of recipients of these funds
were high-income developing countries such
as Chile, a member of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
or upper middle-income developing countries
such as Argentina, Costa Rica, South Africa and

69 O’Sullivan et al, supra note 45.
70 Adaptation Fund Board, Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties
to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund (amended March 2016),
online: <www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/OPGamended-in-March-2016.pdf>.
71 UNFCCC, Dec 1/CMP.4, supra note 68.

72 Ibid.
73 A detailed discussion of the criteria for allocation of AF finance can be
found at Persson & Remling, supra note 65; see also O’Sullivan et al,
supra note 45 at 32.
74 UNFCCC, supra note 44.
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Turkmenistan.75 Studies have shown that the AF has
benefited a group of countries with high per capita
income that were somehow considered among
those with high levels of vulnerability and low
adaptive capacity.76 In practice, the criteria adopted
by the AF so far have not ensured that limited funds
will go to those developing countries that have the
greatest need due to lower financial capabilities
and greater overall socio-economic vulnerability
when compared to their developing country peers.77
The experience of the AF is relevant because other
UNFCCC climate funds also rely on similar broad
criteria to guide allocation of adaptation funds. This
experience is especially relevant to the adaptation
window of the GCF. The fund was created at COP
16,78 which also established that most of the public
climate finance flowing to developing countries,
for both mitigation and adaptation, should be
channelled through the GCF in the future.79 This
has proven challenging, as many developed
countries prefer to channel a substantial amount
of public funds through bilateral channels or
through multilateral channels outside the UNFCCC.
Although climate finance is anticipated to continue
to be highly fragmented in the foreseeable future,
the GCF is expected to become a relevant source
of adaptation finance in the climate regime.
The GCF is governed by an independent board
comprised of 24 members (in equal numbers from
developed countries and developing countries).80
The GCF board receives guidance from the
COP to the UNFCCC, including on criteria for
eligibility and allocation of funds. Unlike the
AF, whose secretariat is hosted at the GEF, the
GCF has an independent secretariat, sitting in
Songdo, South Korea. According to its governing
instrument, approved at COP 17, the GCF will
“promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission
and climate resilient development pathways

75 See AF, “Projects Map View”, online: <www.adaptation-fund.org/
projects-programmes/project-information/projects-map-view/>.
76 M Stadelmann et al, “Equity and cost-effectiveness of multilateral
adaptation finance: are they friends or foes?” (2014) 14:2 International
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 101.
77 Persson & Remling, supra note 65.
78 Cancun Agreements, supra note 24 at para 102.
79 Janna Tenzing et al, “LDC perspectives on the future of the Least
Developed Countries Fund” in LDC Paper Series (London, UK:
International Institute for Environment and Development, 2015), online:
<http://pubs.iied.org/G04040/>.
80 O’Sullivan et al, supra note 45 at 35.
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(in the context of sustainable development) by
providing support to developing countries to
limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
and to adapt to the impacts of climate change,
taking into account the needs of those developing
countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change.”81 There is, as of yet, no
clarity on how exactly the GCF will take account
of the particular needs of vulnerable developing
countries, nor an agreed definition of vulnerability
outside the indications from the UNFCCC.
The governing instrument includes three broad
guidelines for allocation. First, resources will be
balanced between adaptation and mitigation
activities. Second, an approach using a subjective
criterion grounded on results will be used
to allocate resources. Third, the allocation of
adaptation resources will consider the “urgent
and immediate needs of developing countries
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change, including LDCs, SIDS
and African States.” Minimum allocation floors
for the listed groups of vulnerable countries
(LDCs, SIDS and African States) will be established
as appropriate, while the board will also aim
for appropriate geographical balance.
As of August 2016, the GCF had received financial
pledges from 47 countries, regions and cities,
totalling US$10.3 billion.82 So far, the COPs have
given the board significant flexibility on how to
operationalize the allocation of its funds.83 The
board has decided that it will review its strategic
plan on the occasion of each replenishment process,
to revise the vision and core operational priorities.84
That includes deciding on allocation criteria. For
now, the board has decided to allocate early support
for “readiness activities,” meaning small-scale
financial flows, to build country capacity to access
GCF finance. Although all developing countries are
eligible for readiness finance, the board established
that 50 percent of readiness dedicated funds should
go to especially vulnerable countries, including

81 UNFCCC, Launching the Green Climate Fund, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1,
Dec 3/CP.17 [emphasis added].
82 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-second
session, held in Marrakech from 7 to 18 November 2016, FCCC/
CP/2016/10/Add.1, Dec 10/CP.22 at 35 [Dec 10/CP.22].
83 Liane Schalatek et al, “The Green Climate Fund” (2014) Climate Funds
Update at 2, online: <www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/
publications-opinion-files/9376.pdf>.
84 Dec 10/CP.22, supra note 82 at 13.

LDCs, SIDS and African countries. The board has
also established another dedicated funding line
to support developing countries interested in
the formulation of national adaptation plans to
present to the Paris Agreement. There is a cap of
US$3 million per country for adaptation plans.85
The GCF became fully operational in 2015, when
it approved its first eight projects, totalling
US$168 million.86 The approval process was
guided by the initial investment criteria adopted
by the GCF board.87 The board used six largely
subjective criteria to select the first projects:

terms to adaptation funds, provided they justify
the proposal using the existing investment criteria.
This indicates that, when faced with competing
eligible climate proposals from developing
countries, the board will continue to promote
equity, primarily by giving preference to those
candidates that they consider especially vulnerable
to climate change. Based on the AF’s experience
of relying primarily on the existing criterion of
vulnerability for equity considerations in resource
allocation, this strategy has proven ineffective.

→→ impact (contribution to the GCF results areas);
→→ paradigm shift potential;
→→ sustainable development potential;
→→ needs of the recipient countries and populations;
→→ country ownership; and
→→ the effectiveness and efficiency of
the proposed intervention.88
As of May 15, 2016, the GCF had received
another 41 funding proposals, which amounted
to US$2.4 billion. From those, nine proposals
were approved by the board at the thirteenth
meeting.89 Another 10 proposals were approved
by the board at the fourteenth meeting, on
October 14, 2016, totalling US$741 million.90
The board has established an ad hoc committee
to propose a draft strategic plan for the GCF, to be
endorsed by the board. The ad hoc group presented
its main ideas for the draft strategic plan to the
board on March 3, 2016. At the time of this writing,
there was no ongoing discussion in the draft
strategic plan on objective criteria for adaptation
finance. Except for the 50 percent of readiness
finance that is dedicated to vulnerable countries,
all other developing countries are eligible in equal

The Limits of Vulnerability
as Equity Criterion
Scholars and policy makers recognize that,
in principle, decisions on adaptation finance
eligibility and priorities should be informed
by the best available scientific knowledge on
vulnerability of countries, coupled with equitable
considerations.91 Yet, empirical analysis of the
AF activities shows that the use of vulnerability
as primary equity criteria to allocate adaptation
finance has proven highly problematic. Britta
Horstmann has analyzed the allocation of
financial resources from the AF between 2008
and 2010, concluding that the definition of
“vulnerability” remained so broad as to prevent a
proper prioritization in the allocation of funds.92
Asa Persson and Elise Remling also analyzed
the AF’s allocation, concluding that despite the
central importance of the concept of vulnerability
for determining equitable outcomes in allocation
decisions, it had yet to be defined at the operational
level.93 The AF had relied on equal country lump
sums as a way to promote international equity,
or left it to the fund’s applicants to justify why
they were particularly vulnerable using their own

85 Ibid at 5.

88 Schalatek et al, supra note 83 at 3.

91 Terry Barker, Şerban Scrieciu & David Taylor, “Climate change, social
justice and development” (2008) 51:3 Development 317; Hans-Martin
Füssel, Stephane Hallegatte & Michael Reder, “International Adaptation
Funding” in Ottmar Edenhofer, Johannes Wallacher, Hermann LotzeCampen, Michael Reder, Brigitte Knopf & Johannes Müller, eds, Climate
Change, Justice and Sustainability (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer,
2012) at 321.

89 Green Climate Fund, Consideration of funding proposals (Songdo, South
Korea: Green Climate Fund, 2016), GCF/B.13/16/Rev.01.

92 Britta Horstmann, “Operationalizing the Adaptation Fund: challenges in
allocating funds to the vulnerable” (2011) 11:4 Climate Policy 1086.

90 Ibid at GCF/B.14/07/Rev.01.

93 Persson & Remling, supra note 65.

86 Schalatek et al, supra note 83.
87 Green Climate Fund, “Concept Note User’s Guide” at 8, online: <www.
greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/239759/GCF_Concept_Note_
User_s_Guide.pdf/64866eea-3437-4007-a0e4-01b60e6e463b>.
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principles and benchmarks. For this reason, the
authors concluded that the attempts to allocate
adaptation finance based primarily on indices of
vulnerability to climate change under that fund
have so far been disappointing.94 The authors
argued that this obstacle could be overcome if
parties to the UNFCCC could agree on an official
ranking of vulnerability. The challenge is that this
political agreement has proven elusive. Peerreviewed studies on the use of vulnerability as a
climate finance allocation criterion have concluded
that additional efforts by natural scientists to clarify
the concept of vulnerability will not help, as the
concept is impervious to scientific definition.95
International climate policy negotiators have
continuously called for the development of
generic indices of vulnerability to climate
change that would serve as an objective basis for
identifying priorities for allocating adaptation
finance.96 Hans-Martin Füssel has argued that
any country indices or categories based on
vulnerability would be impossible because “there
is substantial scientific and political disagreement
on the measurement of countries’ [climate]
responsibility, capability, and vulnerability.”97
If it is true that categorizing countries according to
climate vulnerability has proven politically elusive,
the categorization of countries based on some
notion of financial and technological capabilities
has proven more politically acceptable. The use of
the United Nations’ LDCs category, which has been
universally accepted by parties to the UNFCCC, is
first and foremost based on criteria such as GNI per
capita, human assets and economic vulnerability
to external shocks. Socio-economic characteristics
such as GNI per capita have been broadly used
as proxies of capability in guiding development
aid policies and resource allocation. One possible
way to find a politically accepted categorization of
countries that should receive preferential access to
adaptation funds, in the case of competing requests
by developing countries outside the LDCs and SIDS

grouping, is to look to how other international
financial institutions and development funds such
as the World Bank, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and the Global Fund have
solved similar challenges to find politically
acceptable equity criteria for resource allocation.

Income Level as an
Objective Criterion
to Guide Preferential
Allocation
Parties to the UNFCCC have demonstrated broad
political agreement that not all developing
countries are the same when it comes to exposure
to the impacts of climate change and capability to
respond to those impacts. This broad agreement
is reflected in the settled incorporation of the
categories of LDCs and SIDS in the existing
UNFCCC legal framework. Countries with
extremely low socio-economic indicators are
assumed to be among the most vulnerable to
biophysical hazards caused by climate change,
as they do not have the financial, technological
or human capacity to address these hazards.
The incorporation of LDCs as a category of
parties deserving special treatment signals the
recognition of linkages among low income levels,
low capabilities to adapt to climate change and
climate vulnerability. This correlation between
income levels and vulnerability has been reinforced
with the long-established trend of the parties to
the UNFCCC to gradually move away from the
original approach that viewed climate change as
primarily an environmental problem, to a more
holistic approach that recognizes the important
social and economic dimensions underlying
the causes and effects of climate change.98

94 Füssel et al, supra note 91 at 323.
95 Richard JT Klein & Annett Möhner. “The Political Dimension of
Vulnerability: Implications for the Green Climate Fund” (2011) 42:3 IDS
Bulletin 15 at 16.
96 Hans-Martin Füssel, “How inequitable is the global distribution of
responsibility, capability, and vulnerability to climate change: A
comprehensive indicator-based assessment” (2010) 20:4: Global
Environmental Change 597 at 598.
97 Ibid.
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98 James P Bruce et al, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social
Dimensions of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group III to the
Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robin
Mearns & Andrew Norton, eds, Social Dimensions of Climate Change:
Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World (Washington, DC: World
Bank Publications, 2009); Jonathan Rowson & Adam Corner, The Seven
Dimensions of Climate Change: Introducing a New Way to Think, Talk
and Act (London, UK: Action and Research Centre, Climate Outreach &
Information, 2015).

Initial assessments of climate change impacts, risks
and vulnerability focused chiefly on biophysical
elements.99 Since 2007, however, the IPCC has
recognized that “climate change impacts depend
on the characteristics of natural and human
systems, their development pathways and their
specific locations.”100 The 2014 AR5 unambiguously
associated climate vulnerabilities to societal risks
and economic development pathways.101 A growing
number of studies highlight the links between
climate change and development, indicating that
climate impacts could slow down or reverse hardwon development achievements, undermine
efforts to reduce poverty levels, and could lead to
human and environmental insecurity, displacement
and conflict in lower-income countries.102
The growing recognition within and outside the
UNFCCC regime of the linkages between climate
vulnerability and the levels of socio-economic
development and financial capabilities to adapt,
warrant rethinking the allocation criteria of the
operating entities of the financial mechanism
serving the Paris Agreement. There is good reason
to argue that these entities should incorporate an
objective income criterion to guide the equitable
allocation of adaptation finance among diverse
developing countries, alongside the broad subjective
criterion of vulnerability. This move would be
in line with the practice of other international
financial institutions and development funds that
faced similar challenges on how to take equity into
consideration when guiding policy and disbursing
funds to developing countries that are dissimilar
in terms of socio-economic development.
To be clear, like the concept of vulnerability, the
concept of socio-economic development has been
disputed, including the importance of income as
an indicator of socio-economic progress.103 There is,
however, a commanding consensus in development
circles that the old basic dichotomy contrasting

99 Ibid.
100 IPCC, 2007, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report: A Report of the
International Panel of Climate Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2007) at 64.
101 IPCC, 2014, supra note 2 at 181.
102 Sandrine Mathy & Odile Blanchard, “Proposal for a poverty-adaptationmitigation window within the Green Climate Fund” (2016) 16:6 Climate
Policy 752.
103 Michael J Trebilcock & Mariana Mota Prado, What Makes Poor
Countries Poor? Institutional Determinants of Development (Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011).

developed countries with developing countries is no
longer adequate to guide international policy in a
world where the group of developing countries has
become significantly heterogeneous.104 Identifying a
group of the most economically fragile countries —
the LDCs — has also been identified as insufficient
to take into account the diversity among developing
countries in terms of socio-economic development.
Intuitively, no one would dispute that Canada
is markedly more developed than Haiti, and the
two countries should consequently have very
different responsibilities to, and support from,
international institutions. Nonetheless, contrasting
the levels of socio-economic development of
Meso-American countries such as Costa Rica,
Mexico, Panama and Guatemala has proven more
challenging. A more nuanced categorization of
countries according to socio-economic indicators
has become crucial to adequately address the
diversity that characterizes the geopolitical
landscape of the developing world nowadays.105
The United Nations has yet to officially agree on
how to institutionalize a move away from the
outdated developing versus developed countries
classification, beyond the creation of the special
categories of developing countries such as the LDCs,
the landlocked developing countries and the SIDS.106
However, some United Nations agencies, such as the
UNDP, global financial institutions such as the World
Bank, and development funds such as the Global
Fund, have adopted rules-based criteria based on
income and other socio-economic indicators to guide
research, policy making and allocation of funds
among countries beyond a North–South divide.
These institutions had to deal with the challenge
of prioritizing certain subcategories of countries
within the broader developing countries group to
better fulfill their mandates in an equitable manner.
Since 1989, the World Bank has used income
thresholds based on calculations of GNI per capita
to classify countries in four categories. For the 2017
fiscal year, the high-income economies category
includes countries with a GNI per capita above

104 José Antonio Alonso, Ana Luiza Cortez & Stephen Klasen, LDC and
other country groupings: How useful are current approaches to classify
countries in a more heterogeneous developing world? (New York, NY:
United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2014).
105 Lynge Nielsen, “Classifications of Countries Based on their Level of
Development: How it is Done and How it Could Be Done” (2011)
International Monetary Fund Working Paper No 11/31 at 3.
106 Alonso, Cortez & Klasen, supra note 104.
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US$12,476, which is double the average world
income level.107 There are now 79 countries in this
category, including some countries historically
defined as developing countries such as Chile,
Uruguay and Saudi Arabia. The middle-income
category is subdivided between lower and upper
middle-income economies. The upper middleincome category includes countries with a GNI per
capita between US$4,036 and US$12,475. The lower
middle-income category includes countries with a
GNI per capita between US$1,026 and US$4,035. The
fourth category, low-income economies, includes
countries with a GNI per capita of US$1,025 or less.
The World Bank thresholds underlying the
classification have been subject to legitimate
critiques, yet they have been politically accepted,
reflecting “a civilized understanding among
sovereign countries about how to label each
other.”108 The classification was deemed necessary
for operational purposes, as the World Bank’s
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development has to fulfill its statutory obligation to
lend only to member countries that could not obtain
external financing on reasonable terms, which were
those within lower-income thresholds. The World
Bank does not use income thresholds because it
equates income with development, but because
it considers GNI per capita as “the best single
indicator of economic capacity and progress.”109
Legitimate critiques of the World Bank system
have led to other attempts to classify countries
according to composites of development indicators.
The UNDP has created a country classification
system based on the Human Development Index
(HDI), a composite index including data on life
expectancy, education, income, and savings and
economic growth. This method was created by
Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq and Indian
economist Amartya Sen in the 1990s. The HDI was
created to focus “on people and their capabilities [as]
the ultimate criteria for assessing the development
of a country,”110 instead of the World Bank’s focus on
economic indicators. HDI is expressed as a figure
ranging from zero to one. Countries with “low

human development” are those ranked from 0 to
0.55; “medium human development” from 0.55 to
0.7; “high human development” from 0.7 to 0.8; and
“very high human development” from 0.8 to 1. The
HDI has had broad worldwide political acceptance,
with profound impact on the design of development
policies around the world. HDI classification has
been used to stimulate debate about government
policy priorities and to guide policy action.
Other international financial institutions have
also adopted an income level criterion as part of
a composite of objective and subjective criteria to
guide allocation of funds among various developing
countries, including the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, the African Development
Fund, the Asian Development Fund, the IMF’s
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, and the InterAmerican Fund for Special Operation.111 Several
global development funds such as the Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI Alliance),112 the
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, and
the Global Fund, which are closer in institutional
design to the GCF, have also adopted income levels
as part of their composite criteria to ensure equitable
allocation of funds among developing countries.
The Global Fund is a public-private partnership
created in 2002 to mobilize and disburse financial
resources to address the HIV, tuberculosis and
malaria pandemics.113 Over the last 15 years, the
Global Fund governance board has revised its
eligibility criteria “to ensure that available resources
are allocated and invested in countries and regions
with the highest burden of disease and the least
economic capacity to respond to HIV, tuberculosis
and malaria, and to key and vulnerable populations
that are disproportionately affected by the three
diseases.”114 The Global Fund criteria establishes
that: “low-income countries (LICs) and lower
middle-income countries (MICs) are automatically
eligible; while upper MICs have to demonstrate a
‘severe’ or ‘extreme’ generalised disease burden,

111 Alonso, Cortez & Klasen, supra note 104.
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or at least a ‘high’ concentrated burden of
disease within a segment of the population.”115
Additionally, the Global Fund’s guidelines require
that all funding proposals from lower middleincome countries invest at least 50 percent of the
requested budget on underserved and most at-risk
populations and/or “highest impact interventions.”116
Funding proposals from upper middle-income
countries must dedicate the entire requested
budget to underserved or at-risk populations and/
or “highest impact interventions.” Members of
the OECD are ineligible to apply for funding (even
if classified as developing countries), while other
high-income countries are ineligible to apply for
funding through a single country application.117
Finally, the Global Fund has developed a
prioritization framework to apply when existing
funds prove insufficient to cover all eligible and
recommended funding proposals.118 The framework
consists of a three-part composite index, with
two objective criteria (income level and disease
burden) and subjective criteria (recommendation
by the Technical Review Panel). The rationale is to
give greater priority to comparatively poorer and
higher-burden countries. By using a composite
of objective and subjective criteria, the Global
Fund has ensured that developing countries with
greater capacity to mobilize domestic funds do
not end up undermining the capacity of lowerincome countries to access scarce global resources
to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.

Recommendation
To be clear, this paper is not assuming that the
World Bank’s or the Global Fund’s interests and
constitutional responsibilities coincide with the
interests and constitutional responsibilities of the
UNFCCC. The argument is that the operating entities
of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism, including
the GCF, face a similar challenge as the Global Fund

and other funding agencies to equitably allocate
scarce finance among developing countries in
different stages of socio-economic development
and with different financial capabilities, and
subject to various levels of vulnerability (in
this case, to climate change impacts).
The recommendation is that UNFCCC funds should
embrace composite criteria that include both
criteria based on vulnerability (vaguely defined)
and criteria based on capability (objectively based
on income levels as a proxy for financial adaptive
capacity). Retaining the criterion of vulnerability to
climate impacts that includes geophysical aspects,
such as exposure to rising sea levels and threats
to food security, as mandated by the UNFCCC, is
extremely important from an equity perspective,
albeit insufficient. Therefore, there is a need to
incorporate an income-based criterion linked to
financial capabilities, so that those developing
countries within the lower-income brackets, which
are less likely to be able to mobilize resources
for adaptation outside the climate regime, have
priority access to limited adaptation funds.
The use of vulnerability as part of the composite
criteria that also includes an income-based
criterion will also serve to ensure that those
upper middle-income countries that are deemed
extremely vulnerable to climate change hazards,
that have sizeable social groups that are particularly
vulnerable, and that show difficulty in mobilizing
domestic finance will be eligible to get financial
support for adaptation from UNFCCC funds as
well. In these cases, as with the Global Fund,
adaptation funds should be earmarked for those
communities that are more socio-economically
vulnerable. Still, if the funds can only cover the costs
of a few of the eligible requests, priority should
be given to those countries in the lower brackets
of GNI per capita that are also deemed highly
vulnerable to climate impacts. In this way, a lower
middle-income country such as Guatemala would
not have to compete for adaptation funds with a
high-income developing country such as Chile.
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